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Trustwrap: The Importance of Legal




This Article puts forward two claims and one proposed new
term. The first claim, buttressed by new evidence in this Article, is
that we have under-valued the importance of binding legal rules in
promoting electronic commerce ("E-Commerce"). The second claim
is that, in light of the demonstrated helpfulness of binding legal rules,
the case for Internet privacy legislation in the United States is
stronger than it was during the start-up period of E-Commerce during
the 1990s. The new term, which is central to both of these claims, is
the idea of "trustwrap"-the ways that merchants can wrap their
transactions in visible, trust-inspiring ways when conducting E-
Commerce.
The idea of trustwrap arose for me in thinking about the Tylenol
scare in the early 1980s. 1 A malicious person injected cyanide poison
into bottles of Tylenol pills, resulting in several deaths and enormous
negative publicity. The Johnson and Johnson Company, led by James
Burke, reacted with perhaps the most-admired crisis response in
corporate history.2
The first part of the response was an immediate announcement
that all Tylenol on the shelves nationwide would be removed
* Professor of Law, Moritz College of Law of the Ohio State University; Chief
Counselor for Privacy in the U.S. Office of Management and Budget, White House
Electronic Commerce Working Group, 1999-2001. My thanks for able research
assistance from Cary Bishop, Larry Glasser, and Aimee Kaplan. My thanks also for
comments from participants at the Enforcing Privacy Rights Conference and the
Conference on International Governance of New Technologies hosted by the School of
Advanced International Studies and George Mason University.
1. Indeed, the working title for early versions of this article was Why E-Commerce is
Like a Bottle of Tylenol.
2. See N.R. Kleinfeld, Tylenol's Rapid Comeback, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1983,




immediately. The company would take whatever short-term loss was
necessary to assure customers that no tainted Tylenol would remain
available for sale. This strbng statement that the company would "do
the right thing" created immediate and widespread sympathy for
Johnson and Johnson.
The second part of the response, and the more relevant part to
the topic here, was the decision by Johnson and Johnson to re-
engineer every sale of Tylenol. Today, every bottle of pills has a
plastic wrap around the outside of the bottle. Customers can examine
this unbroken plastic before they buy the bottle. In addition, every
bottle has a foil seal inside the cap. This foil proves that nothing
(such as the syringe that earlier had contaminated the capsules) has
penetrated the protected area where the medicine actually resides.
Inside the bottle, the medicine exists in tamper-proof caplets or
tablets, rather than the earlier capsules into which the malicious
person had injected the poison.
In short, Johnson and Johnson built trust into every transaction.
Customers use their own senses to reaffirm that the Tylenol is safe.
They touch the plastic wrap, they open the foil seal, and they take a
tamper-proof pill. My informal polling shows that many people will
choose a safety-wrapped bottle instead of a traditional bottle of pills
that lacks the safety wrap. Tylenol regained its market share within
six months of the crisis, and it remains a trusted brand today.' One of
the biggest crises in consumer confidence became one of the greatest
successes.
I propose the term "trustwrap" to bring together the physical
transactions of Tylenol and the virtual transactions of E-Commerce.
The idea for "trustwrap" originates with the plastic wrap and related
techniques that Tylenol uses to demonstrate trustworthiness. We
cannot literally follow the Tylenol example on the Internet and use
plastic wrap to prove that transactions are safe.4 We can, however,
study which techniques build equivalent forms of trust for virtual
transactions. Moreover, the term "trustwrap" invokes the
"shrinkwrap" plastic that goes around a box of software, the
3. Jason Richardson & Eric Bolesh, Toward the See-Through Corporation,
PHARMACEUTICAL EXECUTIVE, Nov. 1, 2002, available at 2002 WL 13373849.
4. The closest analogy would be to use encryption to "wrap" around online
communications. Although encryption is enormously useful for certain tasks, there are
many issues that it cannot solve. For instance, encryption can help prove that the words a
person sends are the words that eventually arrive. But encryption is no help at all in
determining whether the sender is a trustworthy person in the first instance. For an
analysis of the uses and limits of encryption in E-Commerce, see Peter P. Swire, The Uses
and Limits of Financial Cryptography-A Law Professor's Perspective, available at
http://www.peterswire.net.
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"shrinkwrap licenses" that often come inside a box of software,' and,
the "clickwrap licenses" that have spread across the Internet.6 For my
proposed use of "trustwrap", the seller demonstrates in the course of
the transaction that there are legal, technical, or other protections for
the purchaser.
Part I of this Article looks at three of the striking success stories
of E-Commerce-the online credit card, the growth of "clicks-and-
bricks" E-Commerce (companies that sell both on the web and in
physical stores), and eBay. Each of these three success stories
contrasts markedly with the predictions of the Internet pioneers of
the mid-1990s. I argue that each success story has created effective
trustwrap for online transactions. Notably, the trustwrap in each
instance depends substantially on enforceable legal guarantees. This
evidence from the success stories on the Internet shows at least a
strong correlation with, and quite likely causation from, the sorts of
legal enforcement that many observers thought would be irrelevant
for Internet commerce.
Part II of the Article explores the implications of Part I on the
debate about Internet privacy legislation. Based on my own
experience as the Chief Counselor for Privacy for the Clinton
Administration, the debates on Internet privacy have often asked
whether a legislative or self-regulatory approach will be more
effective at fostering trust and encouraging E-Commerce.7 The
success stories in Part I undermine the common view that binding
legal rules will interfere with E-Commerce. In addition, a careful
examination of our experiences with Internet privacy suggests that
legal protections for privacy are more likely to be beneficial now than
they would have been during the start-up period of E-Commerce in
the mid-1990s. In short, binding legal rules for Internet privacy may
well spur E-Commerce and provide more effective "trustwrap" than
self-regulatory alternatives.
5. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in
the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429 (2002); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property
and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239 (1995).
6. See, e.g., Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 5, at 431; Roger E. Schechter, The
Unfairness of Click-On Software Licenses, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1735 (2000).
7. For my own analysis see Peter P. Swire, Markets, Self-Regulation and Government
Enforcement in the Protection of Personal Information, in PRIVACY AND SELF-
REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE 3 (U.S. Department of Commerce ed., 1997),
available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/privacy/selfregl.htm#1A, also available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/SOL3/papers.cfm?abstractid=11472.
I. Trustwrap and the Role of Legal Rules in Encouraging
E-Commerce
This part of the Article will first try to re-capture the vision of E-
Commerce from the initial period in the mid-1990s. It will then
examine how the three success stories of credit cards, clicks-and-
bricks retailers, and eBay have developed contrary to many of the
assumptions of the initial period. In particular, each of the three
success stories has included binding legal guarantees as central
elements of the ways that they build trust into online transactions.
A. The Early E-Commerce Vision of E-Cash, Pure Internet Plays, and No
Intermediaries
The early prophets of E-Commerce were infused with a sense of
the different-ness of the Net.8 Transactions would be done with
revolutionary e-payments. Numerous new payment systems were
discussed and proposed, including at financial cryptography
conferences in which I participated. Mathematicians and business
visionaries such as David Chaum9 and Robert Hettinga ° were
convinced that electronic cash would soon be part of everyone's daily
experience. The patents at the core of these new payments systems
got start-ups off the ground, and major banks invested a great deal of
time and effort exploring how to take advantage of the new e-
payment systems.
Not only would the payments systems be new, but the merchants
would be new, too. The late 1990s was the era of the pure Internet
play." The growth of Amazon and Yahoo! made other companies
hope that they, too, could parlay a hot domain name into worldwide
consumer sales. In the headlong rush to grow, business had to move
at Internet speed. A month (or perhaps a quarter) was an entire new
Internet generation. In this new environment, new Internet
companies would be at a great advantage over the sluggish merchants
of the traditional economy. Generation X would be ascendant, and
their web sites would spell the end of retailers who were managed by
people with gray hair and saddled with expensive real estate.
Next, search engines and other new technology would spell the
end of intermediaries. At the most basic level, the Internet makes
8. Lawrence Lessig has called the views of this initial period "Net95." LAWRENCE
LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 27-28, 33, 53 (1999).
9. See http://www.chaum.com (website of David Chaum).
10. See http://www.shipwright.com (website of Robert Hettinga).
11. See A Challenge for Pure-Play Internet Companies, INTERNETNEWS.COM, Nov. 5,
1999 (contrasting early success of "pure-play" Internet companies with growing success of
multi-channel E-Commerce strategies), available at http://www.internetnews.com/ec-
news/article.php/4_232871.
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information flows essentially free, instantaneous, and global. Old
markets had been characterized by physical and other costly barriers
to matching buyers and sellers. The Internet removed these barriers.
In the new, frictionless market, a specialized seller anywhere in the
world could peddle wares to a buyer anywhere in the world.
Search engines became an almost-magical way to end friction
and match buyers and sellers. As an example, suppose you wanted to
buy a specialty item, such as a left-handed corkscrew. Where would
you find one near your home? How well would the Yellow Pages
solve your problem? What if you lived out on a farm-would you
know how to find the right mail-order catalogue? Well, fortunately,
we live in the world of the New Economy. A search today on
www.google.com found 1,180 sites that matched a search for left-
handed corkscrews! 2 The search took all of 0.12 seconds.
Traditional retailers and other intermediaries would also be
challenged by new technologies for comparison shopping. "Shopping
bots" would put the consumer in charge, allowing the buyer to
compare prices across an enormous range of web sites. The
comparison shopping pages would compete among themselves as
well, offering so many different ways to give consumers just what they
wanted. My www.google.com search for "shopping bot" found
143,000 sites.13 In this vision of the New Economy, we are no longer
stuck with the retail stores that happen to be close to our homes.
Instead, we can shop 'til our fingers drop, instantly honing our
searches to find the best product at the best price.
Taken together, this vision of the New Economy foretold a
future of E-cash, of nimble Internet companies destroying physical
retailers, and an end to intermediaries between sellers and buyers. It
was an exciting vision, promising enormous change, but it has turned
out to be wrong.
B. Credit/Debit Cards vs. E-Cash
Today, after the bursting of the dot-com bubble, it is easier to see
that the prophets over-stated the uniqueness of E-Commerce. The
mathematician might note that "commerce" and "E-Commerce"
share eight out of nine letters. As a straight orthographic matter, they
12. The search was conducted on March 17, 2003. Some of the 1,180 hits are
duplicates, and some do not actually sell the corkscrews, but the buyer clearly has a large
selection of sites that do. Perusal of these sites reveal that an entire industry has
developed on the Internet for supplying hardware and other tools designed for left-handed
people, a market that apparently was previously underserved. When I presented this
paper, one person observed an unsuspected link between left-handed corkscrews and the
title of this paper-having corkscrews that turn the correct way for left-handed people
(clockwise) could actually reduce the sales of pain medicine such as Tylenol.
13. Search performed on March 17, 2003.
are thus about ninety percent the same. As a business matter, too, we
all see that E-Commerce is subject to some ancient truths-
companies must make a profit to survive, they can't lose on every sale
and make it up on volume, and an intriguing commercial during the
Super Bowl can't substitute for actually delivering a good product to
the consumer.
As merchants have rediscovered these ancient truths, they have
also invented ways to build trust into each transaction. For instance,
the victory of credit cards over new e-payment systems is essentially
complete. ' Most consumer purchases over the Internet are made
with credit cards or debit cards participating in the Visa or similar
networks. By contrast, the leading e-payment R rospects are either
bankrupt or have refocused on different markets.
In retrospect, the triumph of credit cards is easy to understand.
Consider the benefits that a consumer gets from using a new form of
e-cash. Essentially, the consumer gets the ability to transfer funds to
the merchant and have the merchant instantly recognize that the
payment is good.
The same benefit occurs when the consumer uses a credit card-
merchants can instantly confirm that the credit card payment is good.
In addition, however, a credit card purchase in the United States
offers two key advantages. First, consumers are protected against the
unauthorized use of the credit card number. By law, the credit card
issuer covers any unauthorized use over $50.6 In practice, most banks
do not even charge the customer for the first $50. Second, the credit
card brings with it an already-functioning dispute resolution system.
If a merchant claims that a customer has spent $200 on software, and
the customer disagrees, then the customer is not charged for the $200
while the dispute is in process.
What new e-payment system can match those two advantages?
A new system has all the usual challenges of getting a global business
up and running, such as figuring out the technology, enlisting partners
to deploy the technology, and getting customers to learn how to use
the new system. In order to match the $50 rule for unauthorized use,
the new system would presumably need to find some private-sector
guarantor against unauthorized use, and would then have to educate
14. By far the most successful non-traditional payments system is PayPal. As
discussed below, however, PayPal actually relies on the existing credit and debit card
systems to offer binding consumer protections. See infra text accompanying notes 17-20.
15. Chaum's Digi-cash is bankrupt. Cyber-cash became a service company to online
merchants, and did not even offer a consumer payment system anymore before its Internet
payments business was acquired by Verisign. See http://www.cybercash.com.
16. See Clayton P. Gillette, Rules, Standards, and Precautions in Payment Systems, 82
VA. L. REV. 181 (1996) (analyzing consumer protection rules applying to unauthorized
use of credit cards, debit cards, and checks).
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consumers about the guarantee. To match the credit card dispute
resolution process, the new system would similarly have to create a
system and then advertise it. These are difficult tasks, indeed.
Credit cards also have another advantage-established brand
names and the accompanying sense of solidity. Consumers (and
merchants) believe that Visa, MasterCard, and American Express are
likely to remain in business for a long time to come. Standard game
theory, and the common sense of most consumers, suggests that these
sorts of long-term players are more likely to follow the rules of the
game than are short-term players. A company that has an established
relationship with a customer and a well-known brand has far more to
lose by cheating than does a new company that might be trying to
score quickly and get out. Established credit card companies thus had
an enormous advantage over start-up e-payments approaches, much
as the U.S. dollar gets trusted more than the currency of a newly
established country.
The success of the online payment system PayPal might, at first
glance, seem to contradict these conclusions about the advantages of
established payment systems that offer binding legal guarantees.
After all, you can use PayPal to transfer money to someone even if
you only know that person's e-mail address. Perhaps, with over
twenty million customers, PayPal has created a truly successful E-
Cash system.1
A closer look at PayPal, however, instead reinforces the
importance of both established payment systems and binding legal
guarantees. In every instance, the recipient is part of the established,
bank-based payments system. Originally, PayPal relied on customer
checking accounts. New customers would inform PayPal of the
routing and account numbers for their checking accounts. PayPal
would verify the account, Is and a customer could then receive money
payments in the checking account. Today, customers are far more
likely to use credit cards to open their PayPal accounts.19 Instead of
being a direct form of E-Cash, PayPal instead piggybacks on the
17. See http://www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/webscr?cmd=_ir-release&rid=339819.
18. For instance, when my research assistant opened a PayPal account, PayPal made
deposits of $.36 and $.11 into the checking account. My assistant then contacted PayPal to
confirm the amounts and prove his access to the account.
19. According to its initial public offering: "For the nine months ended September 30,
2001, customers funded 22.2% of payment volumes through their existing PayPal balances,
26.7% via bank account transfers and 51.1% by credit cards." See, e.g., S.E.C. Filing No.




reputations of customers' banks and the legal guarantees that
accompany participation in the established payments system. °
C. Clicks-and-bricks vs. Pure Internet Retailers
Established bricks-and-mortar retailers have turned out to have
similar advantages over pure Internet retailers. A large and growing
percentage of consumer Internet purchases occurs with "clicks-and-
bricks" sites, where the Web site has the same name as an established
physical-world retailer.2 The offline retailer comes equipped with a
brand name and a sense of solidity. It has "real" stores in addition to
the web site. I suspect that the physical experience of visiting a
Staples, Wal-Mart, or Barnes & Noble helps an individual trust that
the Web site will perform successfully.22 A consumer's transaction
with Staples, for example, is wrapped in the protection offered by the
local store and its national reputation.
But what about the old conventional wisdom, that offline
retailers are too slow to respond to the Internet marketplace? In
part, that conventional wisdom was inevitably going to become less
true over time. We now can see the late 1990s as a start-up phase for
the entire industry of E-Commerce. During the start-up phase, as
with the start-up of an individual company, there are the late nights,
long weekends, and frantic efforts to grow the company before the
cash runs out or the window of opportunity closes. After a time, the
successful start-up company becomes more mature. There is more
emphasis on execution and professionalism, and less need for the
hectic virtues of doing something brilliantly for the first time.
In comparing the pure Internet plays to clicks-and-bricks, then,
many people confused the need for speed during the start-up phase
with the need for speed on an ongoing basis. It is assuredly true that
20. In addition, a majority of PayPal transactions are covered by the legal guarantees
offered by eBay, discussed infra text accompanying notes 25-28. Even before eBay
agreed to acquire PayPal in 2002, about 60% of PayPal transactions were related to online
auctions. See http://www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/webscr?cmd=-ir-release&rid=317994.
21. A search of the "allnews" database on Westlaw found a reference to "clicks and
bricks" as early as a May 24, 1999 article in Ad Week. Use of the phrase ballooned after
that, with 182 uses between August 1 and the end of 1999.
22. I will leave it to the evolutionary psychologists to study the extent to which the
ability to physically sense an item contributes to an individual's trust in the quality of that
item. See, e.g., ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCOLOGY
AND EVERYDAY LIFE (1994). To follow the sort of reasoning used by Robert Wright in
The Moral Animal, it is intuitively plausible to me that the ancestors of homo sapiens
developed elaborate ways on the ancient savannah to tell whom to trust or not trust. Id.
From my own interactions online with other people, I have gotten to know many people
online first, and then met them face-to-face. My own experience is that I often trust
someone more after we have met face-to-face, having a "real" connection to supplement
the virtual connection.
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E-Commerce companies from now on will have to move rapidly to
adjust to changing markets. But so will offline retailers and other
participants in the universally fast-paced world of modern business.
Over time, less of the success of an E-Commerce site will be based on
doing the transaction a different way today than it did it a month ago.
More of the success will be based on traditional virtues such as
managing inventory, controlling costs, buying in volume, and the rest.
In this more mature E-Commerce market, the traditional
retailers' supposed weaknesses become their strengths. Some of the
retailers have taken time to learn to do it right. The office-supply
giant Staples, for instance, saw its Internet sales and profits flourish in
2001, during the collapse of many pure online retailers. 3 It turns out
that rushing to market during the dot-coin boom was not essential, at
least if a brand name and physical stores back up the Web effort.
Along with this possibility of going slow-and-steady, the offline
retailer already has the existing inventory systems, buying
relationships, and cost-cutting measures that provide the competitive
edge in a more mature market.
Clicks-and-bricks retailers also have more in their favor than a
trusted brand name and physical solidity. They, like the credit card
companies, provide value added for E-Commerce transactions.
Physical retailers conveniently provide key services that are difficult
or impossible for pure Internet retailers to match. Physical retailers
are set up to accept returns on damaged or unwanted merchandise.
They can often exchange the item or fix the problem on the spot. If
the consumer is confused, they can explain how to use the product so
that it will work properly. If the product is the wrong size or color,
the disgruntled consumer can see the replacement immediately. The
return or exchange can happen the same day, which is something
even overnight shipping can't achieve. The physical store employs a
live person to complain to or talk with, a touch that some consumers
will value. When warranty work is needed, the physical retailer can
handle it in town, without the need for the consumer to find the right
box and ship it to a distant location.
In addition, consumers who buy from a clicks-and-bricks retailer
increase the likelihood that their local consumer protection laws will
apply. The issues of jurisdiction and choice of law for Internet sales
have been very controversial. 4 Internet merchants have usually
sought "country of origin" treatment, in which the laws of a
23. See Reuters, Staples Earnings Sink, Online Unit Shows First Profit (Aug. 21, 2001),
available at http://www.idg.net/english/crd-staples-772063.htm; Reuters, Office Product
Retailers Welcome Online Success (Aug. 23, 2001), available at
http://www.idg.net/english/crdonline744440.html.
24. For my own views, see Peter P. Swire, Of Elephants, Mice, and Privacy:
International Choice of Law and the Internet, 32 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER 991 (1998).
jurisdiction chosen by the seller would govern. Consumer advocates
have usually sought "country of destination" treatment, in which the
laws of the consumer's jurisdiction would apply. The point here is
that the presence of a physical store is likely to tip the question in the
direction of the consumer's jurisdiction. It will be difficult for a
clicks-and-bricks company to say that the laws of a distant place
should apply when sales by its local retailer would clearly be
governed by the local jurisdiction. The consumer, in essence, gets
insurance against unfamiliar consumer protection rules.
In short, clicks-and-bricks retailers can provide a panoply of
services better than a pure Internet company. (I am not claiming that
all of them offer outstanding customer service, just that the physical
retailers have important advantages.) The consumer gets all of the
advantages of the pure Internet play, because a clicks-and-bricks
retailer typically offers the same mail-in service that a pure Internet
retailer offers. But the consumer can trust that there is the back-up of
help from real people in a real store. And the consumer can know
that local laws will almost surely apply, increasing the trustworthiness
of the entire transaction.
D. eBay vs. The End of Intermediaries
Credit cards and clicks-and-bricks retailers solve some of the
problems of Internet commerce. eBay goes much further. A visit to
eBay's Rules and Safety Overview shows an entire shadow legal
system at work. 5 In my opinion, the phenomenal success of eBay
shows both the efficacy of this shadow legal system and the need for
much larger amounts of trustwrap than the early prophets of E-
Commerce ever dreamed.26
eBay did not start out with a shadow legal system. The early
dream of eBay was premised on a non-legal "feedback" system. The
idea was that sellers and buyers who successfully completed
transactions would accumulate positive feedback, and sellers and
buyers who performed badly would accumulate negative feedback.
This feedback system proved to be a substantial, if incomplete,
success. Today on eBay, many sellers have ratings in the dozens,
hundreds, and beyond, indicating that they are repeat players who
have successfully completed many previous transactions. In this way,
buyers can have substantial trust in their first transaction with a seller
25. See http://pages.ebay.com/help/community/index.html.
26. Some imperfections in the eBay system are discussed in Clayton P. Gillette,
Reputation and Intermediaries in Electronic Commerce, 62 LA. L. REV. 1165, 1177-92
(2002). My claim here is that eBay's trustwrap has reduced a large number of risks for
remote sellers and buyers, not that it has reached some optimal stasis.
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they have never encountered before, vindicating one of the dreams of
the New Economy.
In the pure form of the feedback system there would be no need
for backup legal enforcement to ensure trust. A high rating would
ensure trust, and a low rating would put the buyer on notice to take
extra precautions. In real life, however, eBay has wrapped its
transactions in more and more layers of reassuring legal and practical
protections. Some of these protections address specific imperfections
in the feedback mechanism. For instance, there is now a detailed
legal document explaining the circumstances where feedback will be
removed from the eBay site. There are also now rules to prevent
"shills" from bidding up an auction item artificially.
More generally, eBay has moved far away from the original New
Economy dream that distant buyers and sellers could conduct
transactions over the Internet without any need for the Old Economy
concepts of law and sanctions. To be sure, the Rules and Safety
Overview continues to voice the community-building spirit that was
so important to the initial growth of eBay." The Overview also,
however, contains buyer and seller protections including the
following:
1. Fraud insurance for the buyer, up to $200 per purchase, with a
$25 deductible.
2. An escrow service so that buyers can examine the item before
payment is made to the seller.
3. An identification logo that participating sellers can display to
show that they have a verified identity.
4. Independent services to appraise or otherwise verify the
quality of items.
5. A "verified rights owner" program so that owners of
copyright and other intellectual property can work with eBay to
remove unlawful items. This program reduces the risk that
buyers will be unwittingly buying illegal works.
6. A detailed "systems outage" policy explaining what happens if
eBay's service goes down, including credits from eBay to sellers
in certain circumstances.
7. A "non-paying bidder" policy, including fees from eBay to
sellers who are not paid by buyers.
27. eBay's Community Values state:
(1) We believe people are basically good. (2) We believe everyone has
something to contribute. (3) We believe that an honest, open environment
can bring out the best in people. (4) We recognize and respect everyone as a
unique individual. (5) We encourage you to treat others the way that you
want to be treated.
eBay, Community Values, at http://pages.ebay.com/community/people/values.html.
8. An independent dispute-resolution and mediation service,
available at no or modest cost.
9. A program that insures sellers against "charge-backs" from a
credit-card company if a credit card is used without
authorization.
Going beyond these risk-reducing provisions, eBay transactions
are now subject to an entire anti-fraud investigation and enforcement
program. eBay now has an extensive investigations policy, with
detailed explanations about the list of offenses that it investigates.
Sanctions by eBay range from a formal warning to an indefinite
suspension of the user's account. The disappointed person in the
transaction can seek civil remedies in court. The get-tough attitude
toward fraud was underscored in December, 2001 when two U.S.
Attorney's offices announced guilty pleas by eBay sellers and another
office announced an indictment.
E. E-Commerce and Legal Trustwrap
The point of the discussion thus far is not to deny the many ways
that the Internet has allowed new forms of E-Commerce, much as the
original prophets foretold. The example of the left-handed corkscrew
shows how search engines allow buyers and sellers to find each other
through the Net, even for very specialized goods that could not
previously have sustained a market. Some pure Internet companies,
such as Amazon and Yahoo!, have achieved brand recognition that
most physical-world retailers can only imagine. E-cash may yet
emerge from the shadows to become a significant part of online
purchases (although I tend to doubt it).
The point instead is that a large and increasing fraction of E-
Commerce will take place where there is value added to the
transaction by one or more forms of trustwrap. Credit cards, clicks-
and-bricks retailers, and eBay are just part of the list. Web sites have
come up with other ways to reinforce the trustworthiness of the
individual transaction. For instance, web transactions using Secure
Socket Layers ("SSL") have the familiar lock icon on the screen, and
sites that employ SSL technology generally start with "https:" rather
than "http:", demonstrating to the surfer that encryption is being
28. See Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Man Pleads Guilty in eBay Fraud
Case (Dec. 13, 2001) (at http://www.cybercrime.gov/inciongPlea.htm); Press Release, U.S.
Department of Justice, Man Pleads Guilty to eBay Auction Fraud (at
http://www.cybercrime.gov/wildmanPlea.htm); Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice,
San Francisco Man Indicted for Selling Fake Derek Jeter and Nomar Garciaparra
Baseball Bats on eBay, Harrassing E-mails (at http://www.cybercrime.gov/
derungsIndict.htm).
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used.29 Some sites offer a fax number or other alternative for buyers
who do not wish to give their credit card number over the Internet.
Credit card companies, in a trend I strongly support, have
experimented with techniques such as one-time credit card numbers,
so that the merchant never sees the buyer's permanent credit card
number.3" Each of these techniques adds value to the transaction by
visibly demonstrating to the buyer that there is protection against the
risks of buying over the Internet.
Within the area of trustwrap, some efforts have fared far better
than others. Some companies have tried to establish themselves as
"infomediaries," (information intermediaries) where the consumer
would store a great deal of personal data with the company." The
company would then manage the customer's data, following the
privacy rules chosen by the customer and revealing personal
information only where the benefits to the customer exceeded any
privacy and security risks. Having talked with many of those involved
in infomediary ventures, my impression is that none of them has yet
found a breakthrough business model. The attempts to build
customer trust have foundered on a contradiction-what is so special
about the infomediary compared with all the other online companies?
That is, why should consumers trust one company to manage all their
personal information when the business model is based on consumer
distrust of how companies handle their data?
In looking at the successful trustwrap examples and the thus-far
unsuccessful infomediary experience, one can tell the conventional E-
Commerce story of the importance of market forces in shaping the
growth of online sales. On this view, credit card companies, eBay,
and clicks-and-bricks retailers have all increased their market share
by offering value-added ways of conducting online transactions.
Infomediaries and the many dot-bombs have failed the market test
when they did not offer enough value to consumers.
What is striking to me, however, is the less conventional side of
the story. The early enthusiasts for E-Commerce were disdainful of
law, and believed that new technology would free sellers and buyers
from the constraints of real-space jurisdictions. In each of the success
stories, however, there is a prominent role for law and dispute
resolution in explaining the success of the type of transaction. Legally
binding consumer protections are built into each of the three
29. See http://www.modssl.org/docs/2.8/ssl-glossary.html (defining the HyperText
Transport Protocol (Secure)).
30. Steve Bass, Wily Tricks to Thwart Rascally E-Thieves: Keep Your Money-and
Your Identity-Safe While You're on the Web, PC WORLD, Jan. 1, 2002, available at 2002
WL 7717478 (discussing one-time credit card numbers).
31. See, e.g., JOHN HAGEL III & MARK SINGER, NET WORTH (1999) (the infomediary
idea was notably and persuasively advanced by this book).
successful examples: credit cards offer insurance against
unauthorized use; local retailers offer legal advantages if the product
needs to be exchanged; and eBay now wraps its sales in a long list of
consumer protections. This experience suggests that enforceable
legal protections play an important role as consumers choose how to
conduct their online transactions. The successes in the marketplace
turn out to be highly correlated with legal protections. Law, rather
than being an enemy of the market, is a facilitator of it.3"
III. Trustwrap and Internet Privacy Legislation
We now turn from E-Commerce generally to one of the most
hotly-debated policy topics affecting E-Commerce, the issue of
Internet privacy legislation. Although there are many contested sub-
issues concerning Internet privacy, this Part will try to shed light on
some specific items. After giving a brief history of U.S. government
policy toward Internet privacy, I will focus on reasons to believe that
the case for Internet privacy legislation is stronger today than it was
during the start-up period of E-Commerce in the 1990s. Self-
regulation was particularly apt during the start-up period, with faster
response from industry than Administration support for legislation
would have secured. Crucially, the start-up period provided
important lessons about how to draft privacy legislation in the U.S.
setting. In particular, there are compelling reasons to support the
somewhat surprising conclusion that legislation should be limited to
online collection of personal information, and not extend to all offline
collection. As we consider the possibility of Internet privacy
legislation, the lessons about trustwrap in Part I can shift our overall
sense about the desirability of binding legal rules. Such rules, after
all, have been tightly linked with E-Commerce success, and binding
privacy rules may well build additional such success.
A. A Brief History of U.S. Government Policy Toward Internet Privacy
Commercial activities were not even permitted on the Internet
until 1992."3  During the mid-1990s the U.S. Department of
Commerce and the Federal Trade Commission gradually increased
32. PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD
DATA FLOWS, E-COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE 76-89 (1998)
(for an earlier discussion of how law can facilitate E-commerce).
33. The Scientific and Advanced Technology Act of 1992, signed into law on October
23, 1992, "subtly modified [the National Science Foundation's] authority to support
computer networks that are not limited to research and education." NATIONAL SCIENCE
FOUNDATION, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, REVIEW OF NSFNET, March 23, 1993
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 1862(g)). This change was one important legal step toward
development of commercial activity over what is now called the Internet.
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their attention to privacy issues, especially concerning the use and
disclosure of information gathered at web sites. Secretary William
Daley and the Department of Commerce hosted a conference on the
subject in June, 1998.3' The Clinton Administration announced its
basic positions for electronic commerce and on-line privacy in July,
1997 in A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce.35 The
Framework announced its support for industry-led, bottom-up efforts
to create good practices on the Internet. Until it left office in early
2001, the Clinton Administration continued to encourage self-
regulatory efforts for Internet privacy while stating that other
approaches might need to be developed if progress did not continue.36
The Federal Trade Commission, an independent regulatory
agency, was also active on Internet privacy topics.37 Commissioner
Christine Varney was dubbed "the Commissioner from Cyberspace"
for her attention to Internet privacy and related issues in 1996 and
1997.38 Chairman Robert Pitofsky and other Commissioners devoted
considerable attention to privacy issues. In June, 1998 the FTC issued
its first survey of Internet privacy practices.39 That August the FTC
settled its first enforcement action in the area, with the action brought
for "unfair and deceptive trade practices" under Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act." For the next two years the FTC
continued to bring enforcement actions, issue annual reports about
41Internet privacy, and take other actions in the Internet privacy area.
34. Public Meeting to Explore Privacy Issues Related to Electronic Commerce, 63
Fed. Reg. 33,355 (June 18, 1998). For further information, see Commerce Secretary
William Daley, Opening comments at the Electronic Privacy Summit (June 23, 1998)
(available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/press/623pri.htm; http://www.ntia.doc.gov/
ntiahome/privacy/confino/agenda.htm).
35. The White House, A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, July 1, 1997,
available at http://www.ta.doc.gov/digeconomy/framewrk.htm.
36. For an overview of the Clinton Administration position see U.S. GOVERNMENT
WORKING GROUP ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, TOWARD DIGITAL EQUALITY:
SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 36-39 (1999), available at http://www.ta.doc.gov/
digeconomy/ecomrce.pdf.
37. For an insightful academic account of the FTC's role, see Steven Hetcher, The
FTC as Internet Privacy Norm Entrepreneur, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2041 (2000).
38. Kathleen Murphy, Newsmaker: Becky Burr, INTERNET WORLD, (Aug. 24, 1998)
("Burr, who was then working as a Washington, D.C. attorney, told Varney, 'You could be
the commissioner from cyberspace,' planting the seed of an idea that later fully
flowered"').
39. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS,
(1998) available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/index.htm.
40. The settlement with the web site Geocities, for alleged violation of its privacy
promises with respect to both children's and adults' information, is available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/9808/geocitie.htm.
41. See generally http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/index.html (linking to FTC privacy policy
and enforcement documents).
In the spring of 2000, a 3-2 majority in the Federal Trade Commission
announced support for Internet privacy legislation.42
During this period, from 1997 to 2000, privacy advocates sharply
criticized the Clinton Administration for its support of self-regulation
and its failure to seek broad Internet privacy legislation. These
criticisms were made on a number of overlapping grounds. Some
view privacy as a fundamental human right that must be protected by
law, as recognized for instance in Article 8 of the Council of Europe
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms.13  That Convention has been signed by forty-three
European states, showing widespread support for a human rights
approach to privacy that contrasts sharply with the "self-regulatory"
approach existing in the United States.44
Some critics of the U.S. position emphasized the strict privacy
requirements under the European Union Data Protection Directive.
As countries around the world have increasingly harmonized their
privacy regimes, the United States has become increasingly
anomalous in failing to have Internet privacy protections and
promulgate comprehensive privacy laws more generally.9
Other critics placed more emphasis on domestic U.S. arguments.
For instance, Internet privacy violations implicate First Amendment
values if individuals are tracked as they read at different web sites."
The collection and sale of data treats individuals as commodities, an
42. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION
PRACTICES IN THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE: A FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
REPORT TO CONGRESS (2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/privacy2000.pdf.
43. See Council of Europe, Complete List of the Council of Europe's Treaties, at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/CadreListeTraites.htm. Article 8 provides:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home
and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right except such as in accordance with the
law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health and morals, or
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Id.
44. For an extensive discussion of the case law that has developed under Article 8, see
Daniel J. Solove & Marc Rotenberg, Information Privacy Law 4-24, Ch. 5 (2003)
(prepublication draft).
45. COLIN BENNE'rr, REGULATING PRIVACY: DATA PROTECTION AND PUBLIC
POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (1992); Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving
Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1315 (2000).
46. Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright
Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996).
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approach at odds with individual autonomy.47 In a more instrumental
mode, stronger privacy laws might promote confidence in Internet
commerce, with benefits both for surfers' privacy and companies'
sales.48
Critics' concerns about Internet privacy invasions were
exacerbated by their distress about the Clinton Administration's
opposition to the use of strong encryption. 9 Until September, 1999,
when the Administration shifted position," critics were concerned
about a privacy double-whammy-no technological measures to
protect privacy (because of the encryption limits) and no legal
measures to protect privacy (because of the lack of U.S. Internet
privacy rules). Since the 1999 announcement of support for strong
encryption, there has not been any significant legislation or executive
action to reinstate encryption controls.
The next section of this Article will assess the effects of public
policy during this start-up period of the Internet. Since the Bush
Administration took office in 2001, the governmental leader on the
issue of Internet privacy has been the new FTC Chairman, Timothy
Muris. Chairman Muris set forth his privacy agenda in a speech in
Cleveland in October, 2001."' Chairman Muris declined to support
Internet privacy legislation. Instead, he supported a national "Do
Not Call" list for telemarketing and pledged to increase FTC privacy
enforcement efforts. 2 At the time of this writing in early 2003, FTC
47. See, e.g., Margaret J. Radin, John A. Rothchild, & Gregory M. Silverman, Internet
Commerce: The Emerging Legal Framework, 619-23 (2002) (citing sources on
commodification and privacy).
48. For one examination of the argument that privacy legislation will promote E-
commerce, see PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS:
WORLD DATA FLOWS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY
DIRECTIVE, 76-89 (1998).
49. For one set of materials about the encryption controversy, see Center for
Democracy & Technology, at http://www.cdt.org/crypto.
50. My own statements at the White House event in September, 1999 recognized the
importance of encryption to Internet privacy:
I am here to underscore that today's announcement reflects the Clinton
Administration's full support for the use of encryption and other new
technologies to provide privacy and security to law-abiding citizens in the
digital age... Especially for open networks such as the Internet,
encryption is needed to make sure that the intended recipients can read a
message, but that hackers and other third parties cannot.
Chief Counselor for Privacy, Peter Swire, Statements at a White House Press Briefing
(Sept. 16, 1999) (available at http://www.privacy2000.org/presidential.htm).
51. See Timothy J. Muris, Protecting Consumers' Privacy: 2002 and Beyond, Address
before the Privacy 2001 Conference (Oct. 4, 2001) (at http://www.ftc.gov/
speeches/muris/privispl002.htm).
52. Id.
policy in this area has largely followed the agenda set forth in
Chairman Muris' speech. 3
B. The Case for Internet Privacy Legislation Now That the Start-Up
Period is Over
Roughly speaking, the Internet was mostly in a pre-commerce
period through about 1996. The period from about 1996 until the end
of the Internet bubble in 2001 might be called the "start-up period,"
both for the many individual start-up companies and for E-
Commerce as a whole. The period since 2001 has been one of a more
mature market, with the exit of many E-Commerce companies that
lacked a successful business model.
The discussion in this Part makes the case for different
approaches to Internet privacy protection during the start-up period
and afterward. Roughly speaking, the benefits of self-regulation and
the costs of legislation were likely to be especially high during the
start-up period. The balance shifts more toward the benefits of
legislation after the end of the start-up period.
(1) The Relative Success of Self-Regulation During the Start- Up Period.
Suppose you are a policy-maker considering the possibility of
Internet privacy legislation early in the start-up period, in 1996 or
1997. Suppose, to make a realistic assumption, your goal is to
encourage E-Commerce while promoting consumer confidence and
protecting individual privacy. You wish to improve commercial
practice quickly while holding down compliance costs. In the eyes of
this policy-maker, acting in good faith, how would you weigh the
choice between self-regulation and legislation for Internet privacy?
At the risk of sounding na've, this description of a good-faith
policy-maker actually matches well with my own experience of
discussions within the Clinton Administration about Internet
privacy.54 The essential policy was to support self-regulation but with
an understanding that the Administration would support legislation if
industry did not make progress quickly enough.
53. For the final amended rule on the "Do Not Call" list, see 68 Fed. Reg. 4580 (Jan.
29, 2003). For an updated list of news releases and links on FTC privacy enforcement
actions, see http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/index.html.
54. The substantive discussions about Internet privacy took place in a context where
the chief political forces operated largely in the same direction as the good-faith policy
discussion. The Clinton Administration clearly favored developing electronic commerce.
By the late 1990s it also clearly favored finding ways to protect individual privacy while
holding down compliance costs. See Peter P. Swire, The Surprising Virtues of the New
Financial Privacy Law, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1263, 1277-82 (2002) (discussing the politics of
privacy legislation in the late 1990s).
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I believe that this policy in fact succeeded quite well during the
start-up period. There was a rapid increase in privacy policies during
this period, as shown by the annual FTJC studies. The 1998 study
found that only fourteen percent of commercial web sites had any
privacy statement or notice.5 That number rose to sixty-six percent in
19996 and eighty-eight percent in 2000.51 My view of these numbers is
that the Administration's credible threat to seek legislation, if
industry did not respond, led to a remarkable response by industry. If
the Administration had instead ignored the issue of Internet privacy,
then there would have been a much slower response from industry. If
the Administration had instead pushed for early legislation, then I
think many web sites would have delayed implementing a privacy
policy until they knew the final form of legislation. And that
legislation, in light of the opposition of most corporations and their
political influence, would quite possibly never have arrived.58
Another advantage of the self-regulation-plus-Administration-
pressure approach was the blossoming of policy and technical
innovations for Internet privacy. Major companies competed for
favorable press attention about their privacy innovations. For
instance, IBM announced that it would only buy web advertisements
from sites that posted privacy policies 9 and Microsoft used its small-
business web sites to help its clients develop their own privacy
policies.' The Direct Marketing Association, long engaged in battles
on privacy legislation, adopted the policy and practice in 1999 that
"members would be expelled unless they posted privacy policies that
55. Supra note 42.
56. SELF-REGULATION AND PRIVACY ONLINE: A FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
REPORT TO CONGRESS 7 (July, 1999), at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9907/privacy99.pdf.
57. Supra note 42.
58. The difficulty of passing privacy legislation during this period was illustrated by
Congress' inability to pass medical privacy legislation. See infra note 68 (providing details
of medical privacy rules). As the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act was
enacted in 1996 ("HIPAA"), Congress gave itself until August, 1999 to enact legislation,
or else the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") would gain the
power to draft the regulations. Passing medical privacy legislation might have seemed an
easier task than passing Internet privacy legislation, both because there was a greater
consensus that legislation was needed for sensitive medical records and because the
Republican Congress did not favor granting this sort of discretion to the Clinton
Administration. Nonetheless, no medical privacy legislation during this period even
passed a Congressional subcommittee. The chances for delay in Internet privacy
legislation, even if there had been Administration support, were thus very high. See Peter
P. Swire, The Surprising Virtues of the New Financial Privacy Law, supra note 54
(discussing political history of the period).
59. Carol Emert, IBM Gets Tough About Web Privacy/Post Guidelines or Lose Our
Ads, Company Says, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 1, 1999, at B1.
60. Mark Harrington, Hard-line on Online Privacy: Microsoft Threatens to Pull Ads
from Sites without Disclosures, NEWSDAY, June 24, 1999, at A51.
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included an opt-out for third parties.61  On the technical side,
advocacy groups such as the Center for Democracy and Technology
("CDT") worked with industry to develop the Platform for Privacy
Preferences ("P3P"), which its proponents hoped would create an
automatic software mechanism for matching the privacy preferences
of surfers with the policies of web sites.62
Perhaps the most important innovation, however, was the
creation of the so-called web seal programs such as TRUSTe63 and
BBBOnline.6 The idea of the web seal was that a web site, which was
possibly unknown and untrusted by the user, could sign up with the
web seal program as a private-sector enforcement agency. The web
seal program would only permit its seal to be displayed on sites that
met minimum criteria. Surfers could complain to the web seal
program about any privacy problem, and the web seal program would
act as enforcer, up to the sanctions of withdrawing the seal and
referring the case to public agencies.
The web seal programs are especially important, in my view,
because they created a plausible case that privacy enforcement would
actually be more effective with that sort of self-regulatory program
than under a pure legislative approach. The presence of web seal
programs does not deprive government agencies of the power to
bring enforcement actions against deceptive trade practices; instead,
the web seal programs become a supplement to government agencies.
They are a source of information for companies seeking guidance and
a first line of enforcement for small problems or for problems that can
be readily resolved. Perhaps the greatest advantage of the seal
programs is that they are scalable. The staffs of TRUSTe and
BBBOnline can grow quickly as the number of participating websites
increases. By contrast, my experience in the U.S. Office of
Management and Budget teaches that the same sort of staff increase
61. The Direct Marketing Association's Privacy Policy Compliance Guide can be
found at http://www.the-dma.org/privacy/privacypromise.shtm. On membership
expulsions, see Amanda Beeler, DMA: Members Must Keep Privacy Promise: Columbia
University's Graduate School of Business Faces Expulsion, ADVERTISING AGE, Nov. 29,
1999, available at 1999 WL 26899912.
62. For the home page of P3P, developed under the auspices of the World Wide Web
Consortium ("W3C"), see http://www.w3.org/P3P. A CDT view on P3P is available at
http://www.cdt.org/privacy/pet/p3pprivacy.shtml. For a critique of the P3P approach, see
http://www.junkbusters.com/standards.html (open letter dated Sept. 13, 1999 by Jason
Catlett explaining deficiencies of P3P).
63. For a more skeptical view of enforcement by the web seal program, see Marc
Rotenberg, Testimony and Statement for the Record, Hearing on S. 809, Online Privacy
Protection Act of 1999 Before the Subcommittee on Communications of the Committee of
Commerce, Science, and Transportation (July 27, 1999) (available at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/internet/EPIC testimony-799.pdf, at 64-65)
64. See http://www.bbbonline.org.
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would simply not be politically possible at the Federal Trade
Commission or other enforcement agencies.
65
(2) What We've Learned from the Privacy Legislation of the Late 1990s.
At the level of practice, this history of the late 1990s for Internet
privacy provides evidence that support for self-regulation, combined
with the credible threat of legislation, resulted in a rapid spread of
privacy policies and substantial experimentation on new approaches
for diffusing privacy policies and enforcement into the world of E-
Commerce. Meanwhile, there was a rapid spread of binding privacy
rules in the United States for the most sensitive categories of personal
information held in the private sector. My thesis here is that
legislating first for this sensitive information was a sound strategy, for
both political and substantive reasons.
The most important of the binding rules came in three
categories: (1) information collected over the Internet about children
under the age of thirteen, under the Children's Online Privacy
Protection Act of 1998 ("COPPA"); 6 (2) financial information, under
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 ("GLB");67 and (3) medical
records, under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"), and the privacy regulation first issued in
final form in 2000.68 The political rationale for moving first on this
sensitive data is easy enough to see-it was easier to get political
consensus that there should be binding, legal protections for the most
sensitive types of information, and there was general agreement that
children's, financial, and medical records qualified as sensitive. By
contrast, there was less consensus that information collected by web
sites over the Internet was inherently sensitive.
65. The difficulties in securing enforcement funding for the Securities and Exchange
Commission reinforces this point. SEC enforcement staffing actually fell in the late 1990s,
despite efforts by the Clinton Administration to increase the funding. Sandra Sugawara,
With More to Oversee, SEC Seeks Additional Money and Staff, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2000,
at E3. Even after the Enron and other scandals of 2001 and 2002, funding for enforcement
has hit significant snags. Paul Krugman, Business as Usual, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2002, at
A31 (discussing continuing opposition to SEC enforcement funding).
66. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-06 (2000).
67. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-09 (2000).
68. The privacy regulation was first issued in final form at 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462 (Dec.
28, 2000). It now appears, as modified, at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2001), with relevant
materials provided by HHS at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/hipaa. Under the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1997),
Congress stated that HHS should issue the regulation if Congress did not enact medical
privacy legislation by August, 1999. When Congress did not do so, HHS went forward
with the regulation. See Peter P. Swire & Lauren B. Steinfeld, Security and Privacy After
September 11: The Health Care Example, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1515, 1524-26 (discussing
privacy rule history).
On the substance of good legislation, I highlight four lessons
from the experience with enacting and complying with laws
protecting the privacy of children's, financial, and medical
information: (1) the need for well-crafted exceptions; (2) the
importance of good notices that are understandable to recipients; (3)
the limits of technological fixes; and (4) the importance of carefully
defining the jurisdictional trigger for the regulatory regime.
In drafting exceptions, the challenge is how to permit desirable
data flows while effectively limiting flows that risk harm to individual
privacy. In a 1998 book, my co-author and I criticized the Data
Protection Directive in the European Union for not having a number
of significant, necessary exceptions. For example, it was unclear
under the Directive on what basis accountants could audit records of
a company containing personal information.6 9  Similarly, it was
unclear whether lawyers performing due diligence could examine a
company's records in preparation for a merger." These sorts of
needed exceptions were explicitly included in the GLB and HIPAA
privacy rules.7t Indeed, the Clinton Administration did not call for
any change in the GLB exceptions when it proposed additional
financial privacy protections in 2000.72
Creating exceptions should not be seen, even by privacy
advocates, as "caving in" to industry. It is good public policy, in my
view, to continue to have effective audits and due diligence before
mergers. Safeguards can be and have been included for these
exceptions, so that the auditors or lawyers remain under
confidentiality requirements that prohibit re-disclosure.73 In addition,
the lack of appropriate exceptions can backfire and create political
momentum that can kill a privacy regime. One notable example was
a medical privacy law in Maine that had the effect of making it
difficult or impossible for florists to deliver flowers to patients in the
69. SWIRE & LITAN, supra note 32, at 94-97.
70. Id. at 109-12.
71. In the medical privacy rule, both auditing and due diligence are specifically
included as permissible "health care operations" in 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2002). Under
GLB, auditing and due diligence are included as exceptions under 15 U.S.C. § 6802(e)
(2000).
72. The Clinton Administration proposal was introduced in Congress as the Consumer
Financial Privacy Act, H.R. 4380, 106th Cong. (2000). For a discussion of the bill, see
Swire, supra note 54, at 1292-93. The bill did contain a new exception for certain
customer service activities, but this exception was included only because of the expanded
coverage of the proposed bill, and not due to disagreement with the exceptions contained
in GLB itself.
73. Under the medical privacy rule, auditors and those performing due diligence will
be under the confidentiality requirements that apply to "business associates." 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.504(e) (2002). Similar limits apply under the re-use provision of GLB. 15 U.S.C.
§ 6803(c).
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hospital.74 The immediate effect was to prompt repeal of the entire
privacy law.75 The hope in future privacy legislation is that we will all
learn from this experience which exceptions are needed.
On the importance of good notices, the legalistic notices under
GLB were widely criticized as too difficult to understand and not
effective at letting customers compare privacy policies.76 Although I
have written elsewhere about some surprising virtues of those
notices," we should obviously learn how to do better in the future.
Fortunately, HHS has encouraged a more user-friendly approach to
notices in the medical privacy rule. In response to public comments,
HHS has specifically encouraged a "layered notice" approach, with a
short plain-language notice on top and a more detailed notice as a
second layer." The plain-language notice addresses the goal of
communicating clearly with the recipient. The detailed notice
addresses the goal of ensuring that the organization has examined its
own privacy practices and has created an enforceable set of privacy
promises. In future legislation, we should avoid the mistakes of GLB
and ensure that layered notices are either encouraged or required.
As for the limits of technological fixes, we now have some
experience in assessing the heady hopes of the Internet start-up
period. One lesson has been the limited usefulness of the technology
of P3P as a substitute for legal and institutional privacy protections.
While P3P was under construction in 1999 and 2000, some proponents
argued that legislation was unnecessary because the P3P software
would give users' their desired level of privacy." At the time of this
74. The problem for florists was that they needed prior patient consent to learn the
number of the hospital room, but the patients were usually receiving the flowers as a gift
and so had not given prior consent. See Amy Goldstein, Long Reach into Patients'
Privacy; New Uses of Data Illustrate Potential Benefits, Hazards, WASH. POST, Aug. 23,
1999, at Al (strict Maine medical privacy law repealed two weeks after taking effect after
complaints by florists and other groups).
75. Id.
76. See Swire, supra note 54, at 1313-21 (discussing criticisms of GLB notices and
possible solutions).
77. Id. (GLB notices forced financial institutions to examine their internal practices
and provide a detailed roadmap for accountability in data handling practices).
78. For one such public comment, see Peter P. Swire, Letter to U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services Office of Civil Rights, Apr. 26, 2002 (describing advantages of
layered notices), at http://www.peterswire.net/CommentsShortNotices.doc. HHS
responded: "Covered entities, while encouraged to use a layered notice, are not required
to do so." 67 Fed. Reg. 53,182, 53,243 (Aug. 14, 2002).
79. See Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Orson Swindle, FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE ONLINE
ENVIRONMENT, at 17, 19, 20 (2000) (arguing that the development P3P made Internet
privacy legislation less desirable), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
reports/privacy2000/swindledissent.pdf. The full FTC report is available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/privacy2000.pdf.
writing in 2003, P3P seems far less than a "magic bullet." Even many
of the leading web sites are not P3P readable, and the standard
version of P3P offers much narrower privacy protections than
proponents had originally hoped."
There have been similar disappointments with the "digital
certificates" that the FTC hoped would be an important part of
COPPA.1 In its 1999 rule for children's web sites, the FTC used a so-
called "sliding scale" approach that used insecure e-mails to get
permission for certain uses of children's information. 2  The
Commission believed that, "with advances in technology, companies
will soon be able to use more reliable verifiable electronic methods in
all of their transactions." 3 The Commission specifically believed that
digital certificates would shortly be used widely by parents, and so
allowed until April, 2002 for digital certificates to become the
standard way for parents to consent to uses of their children's
personal information.' These predictions of the Internet start-up
period, however, did not come to fruition. The FTC has extended the
date for stronger forms of electronic verification until April, 2005,5
and it is open to serious doubt whether most parents will be using
digital certificates by that date. 6 In my view, the experience with P3P
and digital signatures suggests the risks of relying on technology to
provide a strong substitute for legal and institutional protections of
personal information.
(3) The Online/Offline Question
A lesson from recent privacy legislation, which deserves
increased attention, is the importance of choosing a good
jurisdictional trigger. For organizations complying with HIPAA,
GLB, or other privacy laws, the initial and most significant question is
80. As of August, 2002, one report found that 25% of the top 100 domains and 17% of
the top 500 domains were P3P enabled. Ernst & Young, P3P Dashboard Report (2002), at
http://www.ey.com/global/download.nsf/US/P3P-Dashboard-September_2002/$file/E&YP
3PDashboardSeptember2002.pdf.
81. In brief, "digital certificates use mathematics or other means to help prove that a
particular person has sent a document electronically and to show that the document has
not been changed in transit." SWIRE & LITAN, supra note 32, at 205; see also A. Michael
Froomkin, The Essential Role of Trusted Third Parties in Electronic Commerce, 75 OR. L.
REV. 49 (1996) (analyzing law of certificate authorities and digital certificates).
82. 16 C.F.R. § 312.5(b)(1) (2000).
83. 64 Fed. Reg. 59,888, 59,902 (Oct. 29, 1999).
84. Id.
85. 67 Fed. Reg. 18,818 (Apr. 17, 2002).
86. On the slow adoption of digital certificates, see Jane K. Winn, The Emperor's New
Clothes: The Shocking Truth About Digital Signatures and Internet Commerce, 37 IDAHO
L. REV. 353 (2001).
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whether they are covered by the law.' Covered organizations are
required to comply with a full range of legal requirements, but other
organizations are not. My own view, which I have recently explained
in some detail,8 is that any forthcoming U.S. privacy legislation
should apply to information collected online, but should not apply to
all information collected offline.
This proposed different treatment of offline and online data
strikes some as unfair. 9 A vice president of Amazon.com, for
instance, writes: "The fact that a consumer last year purchased both a
pair of blue jeans and a cordless drill is not affected by whether this
fact was learned 'online' (e.g., through a website purchase) or 'offline'
(e.g., through an in-store credit card transaction or mail-in warranty
registration card)."9 In response, I believe that there are significant
differences in consumer concerns in the two settings. The very act of
using the Internet reinforces the concern for consumers that their
personal data may spread quickly and in unforeseen ways. In
addition, websites can and do collect far greater detail about
consumer actions than physical retailers-an online bookstore learns
not only which book an individual purchases, but also every other
book that the individual even looks at in the bookstore site.9'
More importantly, legislation targeted at commercial information
collected online creates a bright line concerning who is covered by the
regulatory regime. My views here are shaped by my experience with
the European Union Directive on Data Protection, whose text applies
to an enormous array of online and offline data.92 In the course of
doing research on the Directive, my co-author and I noticed that its
text would quite possibly make it unlawful for many business
travelers to carry laptops on a plane from the European Union to the
United States. In answer to our questions, E.U. officials were split on
87. Under HIPAA, the question is whether an organization is a "covered entity", as
defined in 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2002). "Covered entities" include health care providers,
health plans, and health care clearinghouses. Id. Under GLB, the question is whether an
organization is a financial institution, as defined in 12 U.S.C. §1843(k) (2000).
88. Peter P. Swire, The Online/Offline Question, in CONSIDERING CONSUMER
PRIVACY: A RESOURCE FOR POLICYMAKERS AND PRACTITIONERS 72 (Paula Breuning,
ed., 2002), available at http://www.cdt.org/privacy/ccp/onlineofflinel.pdf.
89. Paul Misener, Parity in Consumer Information Collection, in CONSIDERING
CONSUMER PRIVACY: A RESOURCE FOR POLICYMAKERS AND PRACTITIONERS 76.
90. Id.
91. For further discussion, see Swire, The Online/Offline Question, supra note 88.
92. Article 3 reads in part: "The Directive shall apply to the processing of personal
data wholly or party by automatic means, and to the processing otherwise than by
automatic means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to
form part of a filing system." BENNETT, supra note 45, at Art. 3. There is an exception
for some non-commercial activities, but only "by a natural person in the course of a purely
personal or household activity." Id.
whether the Directive would indeed prohibit such transfers of
personal data.93  On a practical level, everyone agreed that
enforcement against most business travelers was unthinkable. The
problem remained, however, "because of the gap between the
apparent 'Prohibition in law and the apparent permissibility in
practice."
The E.U. solution has been to leave interpretation, for laptops
and other issues, to the discretion of enforcement officials.' No
matter the quality of the officials, I continue to have serious concerns
about an approach that depends on overbroad legislation and
merciful enforcement. Overbroad legislation, if actually put into
practice, leads to needless costs and burdens by those who should not
be included. Overbroad legislation fails to provide clear notice of
what is prohibited and creates the risk of arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. Moreover, if everyone comes to perceive the legislation
as overbroad and unenforceable, the entire law can become a dead
letter. The achievable good purposes of the legislation can be lost,
because the law went too far.
Returning to the issue of offline and online, this experience with
the overbroad E.U. Directive makes me highly skeptical of legislation
that would apply to all commercial offline and online information
collected in the United States. I simply do not think it is plausible
that every babysitter and every teenager cutting neighborhood lawns
will be required to hand out a privacy notice before doing the
babysitting or cutting the grass.96 The vague and limitless application
of an "all commercial data" law would create great practical problems
in determining who was within the scope of the legislation. The ease
of creating horror stories, such as my babysitting or grass-cutting
examples, would make any such law a subject of ridicule and likely
repeal. More likely, an insistence that a privacy law apply to all
offline data will ensure that such a law will never be enacted.
At the same time, an online-only law can address the bulk of the
privacy issues. Such a law could apply to "mixed databases"-data
that combined information from online and offline sources. The
Federal Trade Commission has devoted increasing attention to offline
data practices, and it is quite possibly a deceptive practice to use
93. On the issue of laptops, see SWIRE & LITAN, supra note 32, at 40-44.
94. Id. at 73.
95. For discussion of the problems with this discretionary approach, see id. at 45-49.
96. Babysitting or cutting lawns for money would be a commercial activity. If the
teenager kept notes about the name of each customer, when to go to the house, and how
much had been paid, this sort of personal information would presumably come under a
law that applied to commercial offline activity. If the teenager told a friend that the family
was looking for more help, then that disclosure would presumably be subject to an opt-out
or opt-in requirement.
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information offline in ways that are contrary to the online privacy
policy.9 7 In this way, only companies that rigidly separate their online
and offline databases and sacrifice the ability to participate effectively
in E-Commerce would remain outside the scope of the online privacy
protections. This approach would provide a smooth path toward
widespread privacy protection in the offline world. It would have the
greatest impact on the largest and most important databases, which
pose the greatest privacy risks and which would inevitably be used in
connection with online commerce. At the same time, those who
assemble smaller collections of data in the offline world would not
need to worry that they had unexpectedly crossed the line into
compliance with a federal regulatory scheme."
Il. Conclusion: Trustwrap and the Role of Law in
Encouraging E-Commerce and Internet Privacy
Compared to the Internet start-up period of the 1990s, we now
have the luxury of time and perspective in assessing the role of law in
encouraging E-Commerce and Internet privacy. eBay began as a
norms-based system that depended on customer feedback rather than
legal guarantees. eBay today, however, offers a long list of legal
guarantees, backed up by criminal enforcement for fraud cases.
Credit cards began on the Internet with the disadvantage that they
would not work for anonymous transactions-the credit card issuer
keeps a list of every customer purchase. Credit cards today dominate
E-Cash, however, in large part likely because of the statutory $50
limit on unauthorized purchases and the statutory guarantees of
dispute resolution if a merchant charges for non-delivered goods.
Clicks-and-bricks retailers gained market share in part because of
their brand recognition and the practical advantages of offering
returns and other services in local stores. These retailers also,
97. See Tony Kontzer, FTC Spreading Its Privacy Net. The Federal Trade Commission
Is Making It Clear that Consumer Data Should be Protected Whether It's Collected Online
or Offline, INFORMATIONWEEK, Dec. 11, 2001 (comment by Federal Trade Commission's
Director of the Consumer Protection Bureau that a company's online privacy policies
apply equally to its offline collection and use of data, unless the online privacy policy
contains language limiting the online privacy policy's application to the online collection
of data).
98. The risk of over-breadth is much greater in the offline world than the online. For
the online world, part of creating a commercial presence on the Internet would be posting
a privacy policy. Such policies are already very common, and legislation would simply
ensure that this requirement would become of the standard start-up list, along with items
such as handling credit card payments. In addition, the marginal cost online of providing a
privacy policy is approximately zero, in contrast to the printing and distribution costs of
notices in the offline world.
however, are almost certainly subject to the detailed consumer
protection laws that exist in most jurisdictions.
In a landscape littered with dot-com failures, three examples
stand out as areas of flourishing growth. These three examples, with
the visible demonstrations of trust that they build into online
transactions, should temper anyone's reflexive opinion that statutory
and related legal protections will harm E-Commerce. In saying this, I
am of course not saying that all statutes are good and all efforts at
self-regulation are bad. Any law professor or any businessperson
subjected to a regulatory scheme can think of numerous bad statutes.
What I am saying instead is that we should notice that major
successes of E-Commerce have been accompanied by binding legal
protections. Which legal protections are appropriate, in which
settings, is then a matter for careful study.
On the topic of Internet privacy, we now have the opportunity to
benefit from careful study of the past decade. What is the most
effective form of trustwrap on this contentious issue of handling
personal information on the Internet? A principle theme in this
Article has been the difference between the start-up period of the
Internet, which lasted until the NASDAQ bubble burst in 2001, and
the subsequent period. I have explained my reasons for believing that
self-regulation, accompanied by a credible threat of legislation, was a
sound strategy for improving Internet privacy in the start-up period.
The argument for legislation is stronger today. Legislators and
regulators have developed considerable expertise from the privacy
regimes for children's, financial, and medical privacy. We know much
more about which exceptions are needed. We know how to write
better consumer notices. We have given room for technological
privacy measures to do the job. They have performed far less well
than proponents had expected, thus strengthening the case for legal
and institutional privacy protections. We have also learned, in my
view, that privacy legislation targeted at online practices is likely to be
politically and substantively superior to legislation that purports to
apply to all commercial offline activity as well.
Based on my own experience in the Internet privacy debates
throughout this time, I believe the case for legislation is significantly
stronger now than it was in the late 1990s. Compared to the relative
inexperience and confusion of the mid-1990s, there is far more
consensus today about what constitutes good practices for
commercial sites. The risk of badly-drafted legislation is lower due to
our experience with other privacy regimes. Many commercial sites
have already implemented good practices, and other sites can readily
implement such practices as well.
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This one article cannot address every nuance of the Internet
privacy debates." It aims, instead, to show reasons based on
experience why legislation is more likely to inspire trust, while
avoiding excessive costs, than many in the U.S. privacy debates have
supposed. Binding legal protections have been associated with the
growth areas of E-Commerce. Providing binding legal protections for
Internet privacy-creating statutory trustwrap to match the $50 rule
for credit cards-may well contribute to growth while also matching
the wishes of a vast number of those who use the Internet.
99. For a current compendium of essays on the key issues, see CONSIDERING
CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 88.

